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Jonesing For A Taste of Competition:
Why an Antiquated Maritime Law
Needs Reform
William H. Yost III*
INTRODUCTION

The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly referred to as
the Jones Act, is perhaps America’s most revered piece of
admiralty legislation. The historic law is best known for providing
seamen—the “Wards of Admiralty” 1—with a mechanism to sue
their employers in court for negligence.2 Lesser known provisions
of the Jones Act, however, serve as the basis of America’s
*Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2013;
B.A., Fairfield University, 2006. The author would like to thank Jonathan
Gutoff, an invaluable resource for all things maritime, Sheila O’Rourke and
the Notes and Comments team for their thoughtful feedback and
encouragement during the drafting process, and the Articles Editors who
worked diligently on the final preparations of this article. Many thanks also
to my parents who encouraged me to attend law school and have helped me
along the way.
1. See generally The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (U.S. 1936)
(“The [Jones Act] was remedial, for the benefit and protection of seamen who
are peculiarly the wards of admiralty.”).
2. “A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman
dies from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect to
bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the
employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury
to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.” 46
U.S.C § 30104 (2006). Contrast this with the majority of employment
scenarios wherein an injured employee can recover workers’ compensation
benefits, but is prohibited from bringing a direct negligence claim against his
employer.
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cabotage, or “coastwise” laws, which regulate the transportation of
goods between two points in the same country. 3 These sections of
the Jones Act mandate that only U.S.-owned ships transport goods
from one port in the United States to another. 4 In addition, U.S.
ships engaged in coastwise trade must be purchased in America,
must receive maintenance and be repaired only in U.S. shipyards
and must employ crews in which seventy-five percent of the
members are U.S. citizens.5
While popular and vigorously
defended in America’s maritime community, the Jones Act is a
facially protectionist law that has had damaging effects on
America’s economy as a whole and, in fact, may actually serve to
restrict the maritime industry in this current era of expected
maritime growth.
This Comment argues that the Jones Act is an antiquated
law, troubled since its passage over ninety years ago, no longer
serving either its intended purpose or its modern justifications for
existence, and should be reformed. Part I considers the legislative
intent of the Jones Act, its treatment in courts, and the modern
security-related justifications for the law. Part II examines the
detrimental economic impact the Jones Act imposes on three
groups: cargo shipping companies, consumers, and shipbuilders.
Part III argues that the Jones Act is both a potential obstacle to
environmental disaster response and an impediment to a
developing area of expected maritime growth. Part IV sets forth
proposals for Jones Act reform which are based primarily on
comparisons between the Jones Act to the cabotage law of other
nations.
I. THE BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE JONES ACT, ITS TREATMENT
IN COURTS, AND MODERN JUSTIFICATIONS

A. Historical Background
While the Merchant Marine Act was passed in 1920, cabotage
3. The word cabotage comes from the French word, caboter, which
means to sail coastwise or by the capes—the visible points on the shore.
Kathleen Magee, U.S. Cabotage Laws: Protective or Damaging? M.A. Project,
Monterey Institute of Institutional Studies (Apr. 2002), available at
http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/pdf/ma_projects/magee.pdf.
4. 46 U.S.C § 55102 (2006).
5. Id.
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laws have existed in the United States for as long as it has
enjoyed independence.6 In 1789, the first Congress passed “An
Act Imposing Duties on Tonnage,” which levied a duty on foreign
ships for coastwise trade of fifty cents per ton, while the duty for
U.S. ships was six cents per ton.7 In 1817, Congress passed “An
Act concerning the navigation of the United States,” which
explicitly reserved coastwise trade to only U.S.-flagged vessels on
penalty of forfeiture of the merchandise. 8 While various other
pieces of legislation were passed prior to the Jones Act to prevent
circumvention of the basic protectionist principle set forth in the
1817 Act,9 the historical underpinnings that contributed to and
necessitated the Jones Act were distinct from that purpose. 10
In the years leading up to World War I, Congress established
the Shipping Board and provided it with funding to construct
vessels for U.S.-flag steamship services. 11 However, by the time
Congress declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, the Shipping
Board was faced with a shipping crisis: the United States simply
lacked the ships necessary to transport and supply its troops for a
war in Europe.12 In response, it created a subsidiary, the
6. See Constantine G. Papavizas & Bryant E. Gardner, Is the Jones Act
95, 97 (2008-09), available at
Redundant? 21 U.S.F. MAR. L.J.
http://winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/15%20Papavitzas_Gardner%2021.1.
pdf.
7. Id.; An Impact Imposing Duties on Tonnage, 1 Stat. 27 (1789),
available at YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century
/qw08.asp. Tonnage refers to the cargo carrying capacity of a vessel. Id.
8. Papivas, supra note 6, at 99; Magee, supra note 3, at 20.
9. See Papivas, supra note 6, at 100.
10. See RENE DE LA PEDRAJA, THE RISE & DECLINE OF U.S. MERCHANT
SHIPPING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 53-63 (1992).
11. Id. at 53.
12. The following excerpt provides an apt illustration of this crisis:
The shipping difficulties were tremendously compounded by the U.S.
entry into World War I. [Edward N.] Hurley [chairman of the
Shipping Board] inherited the large and apparently insoluble
problem of carrying and supplying U.S. troops. To transport General
John J. Pershing and the vanguard of the American Expeditionary
Force to France, the Shipping Board had to strip the coastwise and
intercoastal steamship companies like Luckenbach, AmericanHawaiian, and the Ward Line of their passenger liners and add
three of the navy’s four troop transports, one of the U.S.-flag
passenger liners of the International Mercantile Marine, and two
passenger-cargo ships of the United Fruit Company. The motley
flotilla sailed under U.S. Navy escort on 14 June but it was unable to
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Emergency Fleet Corporation, and together embarked on a
historic shipbuilding campaign. 13
Just as the shipbuilding
program was gaining traction, the war unexpectedly ended on
November 11, 1918, and the Emergency Fleet Corporation
suddenly needed to decide the fate of over one thousand partlyconstructed ships. 14
The Jones Act, signed on June 5, 1920, enabled the Shipping
Board to sell the excess ships at deeply discounted prices to
private operators in an effort to create and benefit American
steamship companies.15 It has been argued that the true original
intent of the Jones Act had little to deal with cabotage laws, and
was actually concocted mainly as a solution to deal with this
government-controlled surplus of merchant vessels.16 Ironically,
the shipping market collapsed in 1920, not long after the passage
of the Jones Act, because many of the shipping companies that
had purchased vessels in 1919 did so at considerably higher prices
on borrowed money, and went into bankruptcy in 1920.17
B. Purpose
In order to determine if the Jones Act is still a necessary law,
it is important to understand the legislative purpose and intent of
the act and whether those concerns and objectives remain true
today. The Merchant Marine Act, passed in 1920, was written
with a clear objective:
It is necessary for the national defense and the
development of the domestic and foreign commerce of the
United States that the United States have a merchant
marine—(1) sufficient to carry the waterborne domestic
commerce and a substantial part of the waterborne
carry the whole force. As only one of the ships had been designed for
transatlantic travel, they were simply too small. Reluctantly the
Shipping Board had to turn to British-flag ships, including those of
the International Mercantile Marine, to transport the overwhelming
majority of the American Expeditionary Force, with Navy escorts
along part of the voyage being the only U.S.-flag participation.
Id. at 55-56.
13. Id. at 54.
14. Id. at 58.
15. Id. at 62.
16. Papavizas, supra note 6, at 104.
17. PEDRAJA, supra note 10, at 63.
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export and import foreign commerce of the United States
and to provide shipping service essential for maintaining
the flow of the waterborne domestic and foreign
commerce at all times; (2) capable of serving as a naval
and military auxiliary in time of war or national
emergency. 18
Thus, it seems as though the legislature was primarily
concerned with its ability to maintain a strong and stable
merchant marine, and wanted the capability to summon American
merchant vessels to serve the military in times of war or national
emergency. 19
C. Treatment in Courts
The judicial branch, over the years, has seemingly lost touch
with the stated purpose (or the historical underpinnings) of the
Jones Act—to promote a merchant marine capable of serving the
military—and instead has interpreted it as having a clear,
protectionist purpose.20 For example, in 1970, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Marine Carriers Corp.
v. Fowler, referred to the cabotage provisions of the Jones Act as
“unabashedly protectionist.” 21 It noted that the aims of the Jones
Act are “to protect the American shipping industry already
engaged in the coastwise trade, to provide work for American
shipyards, and to improve and enhance the American Merchant
Marine.” 22 In fact, Circuit Judge Irving R. Kaufman opined that:
18. 46 U.S.C.S. § 50101 (2006). The remaining objectives include: (3)
owned and operated as vessels of the United States by citizens of the United
States; (4) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of
vessels constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and
efficient citizen personnel; and (5) supplemented by efficient facilities for
building and repairing vessels. Id. The Merchant Marine Act is commonly
referred to as the Jones Act and is named after Senator Wesley L. Jones who
was the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce in 1920. Papaviza,
supra note 6, at 96.
19. Query whether this service could violate the Third Amendment.
20. See Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 708 (2d Cir.
1970).
21. Id. The case concerned whether a rebuilt vessel was eligible for
coastwise trade, and involved a factual dispute as to whether it was a rebuilt
American vessel or a rebuilt foreign vessel. Id. at 704.
22. Id.; see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 C.I.T. 229,
233, 551 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1982) (“The Merchant Marine
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Like all maritime nations of the world, the United States
treats its coastwise shipping trade as a jealously guarded
preserve. In order to participate in this trade, a vessel’s
credentials must be thoroughly American. The ship must
have been built in an American shipyard and be owned by
American citizens. Moreover, it must not have trifled
with its American heritage. 23
Even when courts have accurately articulated the legislative
intent of the Jones Act, such articulations seem of dubious
practicality for our nation’s current security needs.
In
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Dillon, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals correctly noted that “the broad congressional
purpose underlying [the Jones Act] was to stimulate and
encourage resort to domestic shipyards and thus ensure them
sufficient business so that their facilities would be adequate in
times of national emergency.” 24 Similarly, in 1982, the D.C.
Circuit noted, “[w]e require a sound merchant marine to protect
foreign trade and to provide support for the armed forces in times
of war or national emergency. We also require a modern, efficient
shipbuilding industry capable of providing military vessels in
times of stress.” 25
D. Modern Justifications—Maritime Security
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of preserving
the Jones Act is that it promotes the security of the United States,
but even this argument is frustrated by the existence of modern
maritime security-related legislation. Certainly, the Jones Act
was intended to ensure the existence of a merchant marine ready
and capable to assist the military in times of war or emergency.
In the words of the American Maritime Partnership:
A strong domestic maritime industry is vital to promoting
Act is designed to protect the American shipping industry engaged in
coastwise trade, to provide work for American shipyards and to improve the
American merchant marine.”).
23. Fowler, 429 F.2d at 703.
24. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir.
1965). At issue in this case was whether a vessel with a foreign-made
midsection was eligible for coastwise trade. Id. at 293.
25. Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908,
911 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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national, homeland and economic security. The Jones Act
establishes a U.S. merchant marine of skilled seafarers
and U.S.-flagged vessels essential for maintaining the
flow of domestic waterborne commerce that is also
capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in
times of war or national emergency. The U.S. Navy
considers the Jones Act “critical to national security” and
every U.S. President of this generation has supported the
maritime law.26
In addition, there has emerged a post 9/11 national security
argument which asserts that repealing the Jones Act would
permit increased access to our ports by international fleets, and
could enable infiltration by terrorists.27 The Lexington Institute,
a non-profit think tank which focuses on national security among
other issues, has published a report about the Jones Act’s
contributions to national security in which it states:
Since September 11, the United States has sought to
create a multi-layered system to protect the United
States from state-based and terrorist attack while
continuing to permit the free flow of legitimate goods,
services and people across the nation’s borders. A key
element in the national strategy to secure the homeland
is to gain sufficient visibility into movement of goods and
people to the United States so as to uncover and interdict
any attempt to use the global transportation network to
launch an attack. Although the Jones Act was not written
with today’s threats to homeland security in mind, its
provisions provide an important base on which to build
the systems, processes and procedures needed to secure
America. The provisions in the Jones Act regarding vessel
ownership and manning simplify efforts to ensure that
26. News, Governor Rick Perry Expresses Support For Jones Act,
AMERICAN MARITIME PARTNERSHIP (Nov. 3 2011), http://www.mctf.com
/news/2011/Gov%20Perry%20Jones%20Act%20Statement.html. The American Maritime Partnership is a broad-based coalition that represents the
interests of the domestic maritime industry. Id.
27. Dr. Daniel Goure, The Contribution of The Jones Act To U.S.
Security,
The
Lexington
Institute
(Oct.
2011),
available
at
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/Contr
ibution_of_the_Jones_Act.pdf.
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rogue regimes and international terrorists cannot strike
at this country via its ports and waterways. One could
readily assert that were there no Jones Act, Congress
would have to invent one. 28
In response to the 9/11 attacks, maritime vulnerabilities with
respect to terrorism have been mitigated, or at least addressed, by
both international and domestic agreements and legislation.29
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (“ISPS”),
signed by parties to the International Convention on the Safety of
Life at Sea (“SOLAS Convention”), came into force in 2004 and
has mandated that ships and ports engaged in international trade
implement ship and port security plans respectively. 30 These
plans require strict documentation of all security procedures and
the continuous monitoring for and recording of security
irregularities. 31 Domestically, the Maritime Security Act of 2002
mandates that U.S. vessels follow the ISPS Code. 32 In addition,
the Coast Guard requires all vessels, regardless of their country of
registration to submit a notice of arrival to a given U.S. port 96
hours in advance. 33 This advanced notice provides the port with
the opportunity to investigate that vessel’s origin and recent
destinations to determine if it has traveled to any ports around
28. Id. The Lexington Institute’s mission is, in pertinent part, to:
[i]nform, educate, and shape the public debate of national priorities
in those areas that are of surpassing importance to the future
success of democracy, such as national security, education reform,
tax reform, immigration and federal policy concerning science and
technology. By promoting America's ability to project power around
the globe we not only defend the homeland of democracy, but also
sustain the international stability in which other free-market
democracies can thrive.
Mission, The Lexington Institute, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/mission.
29. See JOSEPH AHLSTROM, VESSEL SECURITY OFFICER, Cornell Maritime
Press, 1-2, 49 (2006).
30. Id.
The SOLAS Convention is an international convention
concerning the safety of merchant ships. Its first version came in 1914 in
response to the Titanic disaster, and has been updated periodically ever
since. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974,
MARITIME
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.imo.org/about
INTERNATIONAL
/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-for-the-safetyof-life-at-sea-(solas),-1974.aspx.
31. AHLSTROM, supra note 29, at 2.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 49.
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the world which have recently experienced a security incident
before it grants entry. 34
In terms of international access to actual port facilities and
cargo, it may be a surprise that the majority of port terminals in
the United States are actually leased to foreign shipping
companies by the particular port authorities. 35 Despite this, the
cargo
is
actually
handled—loaded
and
unloaded—by
longshoremen who are American, unionized dockworkers.36
Therefore, between the Maritime Transportation Security Act,
Coast Guard regulations, and the existence of unionized
dockworkers, there is little reason to believe that liberalizing
domestic cabotage laws would increase America’s vulnerability to
terrorist attacks.
II. THE ECONOMIC DANGERS OF PROTECTIONISM

“It is important to recognize that while protectionist
legislation may offer relief to a specific domestic industry,
the interests of corporate America are not served by the
protectionist revival.” 37
“Once protectionist tariffs were for infant industries; now
they are for the old and putatively senile.” 38
During the past decade, there has been a robust and growing
discussion in America about the benefits and implications of free
trade, and whether to liberalize this nation’s trade policy. 39 At the
forefront of this debate is determining the proper role of tariffs in
foreign trade, which are widely considered the preeminent tool of
protectionist lawmaking. While the Jones Act is not a tariff in the
34. Id.
35. See The Committee on Int’l Trade, The Ramifications of the Port
Security Legislation on Trade and National Security, 63 THE REC., 161, 165
(2008) [hereinafter Ramifications].
36. Id. at 167.
37. LOUIS E. V. NEVAER AND STEVEN A. DECK, THE PROTECTIONIST THREAT
TO CORPORATE AMERICA 67 (1989).
38. Id. (quoting John Kenneth Galbraith, a noted economist).
39. See Alan Wm. Wolff, America’s Trade Policy Agenda and the Future
of U.S. Trade Negotiations: Testimony Before the House Ways and Means
Committee 1, 12 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/UploadedFiles/WolfftestFC229.pdf;
Rachel
Brewster,
The
Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking International Trade
and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (2011).
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traditional sense, its protectionist effects can hardly be disputed.
Yet, there is also little dispute that the outright repeal of the
Jones Act would create an immediate, and perhaps lasting, loss of
jobs in America’s maritime industry. Former Vice-Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Robert W. Ferguson once commented that
when “[b]alancing the pain for a few against the lasting gains for
the economy as a whole, economists generally view the latter as
outweighing the former, but it is admittedly difficult for many
individuals in American society to share this assessment.” 40
There is, perhaps, no better example of how this “pain for a
few” has been the driving force in maintaining a protectionist
policy than with the U.S. Merchant Marine’s unified voice in
preserving the Jones Act. 41
However, it is no secret that
protectionist policies have adverse impacts on the economy and
nation as a whole. As Ferguson noted, protectionist actions
“reduce variety and raise costs for consumers; they distort the
allocation of resources in the economy by encouraging excessive
resources to flow into protected sectors; and they foster
inefficiency by reducing the extent of competition.” 42 While
Ferguson was speaking generally about the consequences of
import tariffs, an easy analogy can be drawn to protectionist
coastwise trade laws; in fact, two of the three of consequences
Ferguson highlights are strikingly consistent with the effects of
the Jones Act. 43
40. Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Fed. Res., Remarks at the
Conference on Trade and the Future of American Workers (Oct. 7, 2004),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/2004100
7/default.htm.
41. See About Us: Objectives, TRANSPORTATION INST. (last visited Sept.
13, 2012), http://www.trans-inst.org/index.html (the Transportation Institute
is a maritime organization dedicated to maintaining a strong U.S. merchant
marine and advocates for the preservation of the Jones Act).
42. Ferguson, supra note 40.
Ferguson also noted other “highly
egregious consequences” of protectionist policies, including:
First, by raising the cost of goods that are inputs for other producers,
import barriers may destroy more jobs in so-called ‘downstream’
sectors than they save in protected sectors. According to one study,
the 2002 steel safeguard program contributed to higher steel prices
that eliminated about 200,000 jobs in steel-using industries, whereas
only 187,500 workers were employed by U.S. steel-producers in
December 2002.
Id.
43. The second consequence, “they distort the allocation of resources in
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A. Reduced Variety and Increased Costs for Consumers
When considering Ferguson’s point regarding reduced variety
and increased costs for consumers, there are at least two groups of
consumers directly impacted. The first group is the coastwise
shippers—companies that own or charter shipping vessels to
transport cargo. These companies are required not only to
purchase American-made vessels, but also must have all
subsequent repairs performed in America. 44 The second group is
the everyday American consumer—any person that purchases
goods that, at some point, were shipped from one port in this
country to another. Because of the Jones Act, the shipping
company, which cannot purchase foreign-made, competitivelypriced ships or repair its ships in more competitive, foreign
shipping yards, is saddled with higher capital costs.
Not
surprisingly, a portion of these higher capital costs are passed on
to the American consumer in the form of higher prices for goods on
the shelves and at the pump.
1. Shippers
The U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act not only raises
the capital expenditures for existing shipping companies in
theory, but also creates barriers of entry making it difficult for
prospective shipping companies to enter the market. In terms of
cost, it is estimated that the expense of constructing a Jones Act
ship in America is roughly three to four times what it would cost
for the construction of an equivalent ship in Asia. 45 In addition,
the mandates for maintenance and repair to be performed only in
the United States impose additional costs for this group and make
it difficult for shippers to compete with land-based alternatives for
cargo transport like trucks and rail. 46 In fact, comparable ships in
the economy by encouraging excessive resources to flow into protected
sectors,” more aptly applies to government subsidies. Id.
44. See 46 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012).
45.
Paul Slater, Maritime Leader: Throw Out Jones Act Requirement for
US Built Ships, HAWAI’I FREE PRESS, May 3, 2011, http://hawaiifreepress
.com/ArticlesMain/tabid/56/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/4219/categoryId/
52/Maritime-Industry-Leader-Throw-out-Jones-Act-requirement-for-USBuilt-ships.aspx.
46. William O. Gray, Performance of US Shipyards in the 20th / 21st
Century, 24[4] J.OF SHIP PRODUCTION, 202 (2008).
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Third World nations are able to replace vessels with less
frequency than in the U.S. because maintenance and repair costs
are less cumbersome enabling a longer ship lifespan. 47
Not surprisingly, many American shipping companies have
avoided replacing their Jones Act-eligible vessels for as long as
possible, but that trend likely will forcibly end in the near
future.48 In fact, the average deep-draft ocean-going shipping
vessel servicing the noncontiguous United States (Alaska, Hawaii,
and Puerto Rico) is twenty-eight years old.49 Comparatively, most
foreign shipping companies replace equivalent vessels after
twenty-five years.50 While this may not seem like a significant
difference, it should be emphasized that this is not an apples to
apples comparison; rather, it compares the average age of
American ocean-going vessels currently in operation (many of
which are owned by shipping companies facing serious financial
straits) with the average replacement age of equivalent foreign
vessels. When American shipping companies finally decide to
invest in a new construction out of necessity, they are faced with
numerous difficulties:
The major U.S. shipbuilding yards do not deliver new
ships [with foreign-inspired innovations] because they
have become uncompetitive under the protectionist shield
of the Jones Act. The cost of building large oceangoing
ships in the United States is at least three times greater
than at the internationally competitive shipyards in
Japan and South Korea. The process of contracting for a
commercial oceangoing ship from a major U.S.
shipbuilding yard is cumbersome, fraught with
difficulties and subject to delays in delivery and
significant cost overruns. These contracting practices
reflect the U.S. shipyards’ heavy reliance on military

47. DE LA PEDRAJA, supra note 10, at 137.
48. See Michael Hansen, US-Build Requirement For Ships: Dilemma for
Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, HAWAI’I FREE PRESS, Jan. 26, 2012,
http://hawaiifreepress.com/ArticlesMain/tabid/56/articleType/
ArticleView/articleId/5974/USBuild-requirement-for-ships-Dilemma-forHawaii-Guam-Alaska-and-Puerto-Rico.aspx. [hereinafter Hansen Dilemma].
49. Id.
50. Slater, supra note 45.
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construction.51
An illustrative example of the adverse effects of the Jones
Act’s U.S.-build requirement on an American shipping company
involves one of the nation’s leading shipping companies, Horizon
Lines.
Horizon Lines currently owns or leases twenty
containerships and is one of two main shipping companies that
services Hawaii. 52 However, it is also in the midst of a financial
crisis and needs to determine what will become of its fleet of
containerships which are an average of thirty-five years old. 53 A
few years ago, the company tried to solve the problem by replacing
some of its aging Jones Act ships with Korean-made ships to
service the Guam-Far East trade route (which does not require
Jones-Act ships). 54 This move, however, caused them to lose
market share of the more profitable Hawaii-West Coast trade to
their main competitor, Matson Navigation, since the Korean-built
vessels were not eligible for that trade route.55 The Hawaii-West
Coast trade route is more profitable in large part because of the
limited number of shipping companies that service that trade
route, and by replacing some of its fleet with ineligible Koreanmade vessels Horizon Lines limited its ability to service that
market. 56 Currently, it is estimated that Horizon Lines needs to
raise at least $2 billion to replace its Jones Act-eligible fleet. 57 If
they are unable to do this then Matson Navigation could end up
with a near monopoly on the Hawaii-West Coast trade, which
could have serious implications on the cost of goods.
Regardless of the outcome of this particular matter, it is clear
that the U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act is imposing
unnecessary costs on shipping companies, and, while their plight
may fall on deaf ears, their towering capital costs will eventually
51. Hansen Dilemma, supra note 48.
52. About Us, HORIZON LINES (last visited Sept. 13, 2012),
http://www.horizonlines.com/About-Horizon.aspx; Michael Hansen, Horizon
Lines Troubles Show Need For Reform of US Build Requirement, Hawaii
Reporter, Sept. 12, 2011, available http://www.hawaiireporter.com/horizonlines-troubles-show-need-for-reform-of-us-build-requirement/123. [hereinafter
Hansen Horizon].
53. Hansen Dilemma, supra note 48; Hansen Horizon, supra note 52.
54. Hansen Horizon, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.

YOST DESKTOPPED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/9/2013 4:04 PM

A TASTE OF COMPETITION

65

trickle down and impact the next group, consumers.
2.

Consumers

The US International Trade Commission (“USITC”) has
periodically attempted to quantify the economic impact of the
Jones Act and other protectionist legislation on the American
economy. 58 In 1995, it investigated and attempted to quantify the
economic effects of U.S. trade restraints, including the Jones Act,
on the U.S. economy.59 These findings have generally been
updated every two years. In 2002, the USITC estimated that
complete liberalization of the cabotage provisions of the Jones Act
would create a U.S. economic welfare gain of $656 million, 60 and
The
in 2009, it calculated that figure at $1.32 billion. 61
commission explained that this figure is the “annual reduction in
real national income imposed by the Jones Act.” 62 The potential
savings of liberalizing the cabotage laws—or the costs imposed
from maintaining these laws (depending on your prospective)—are
attributed to the fact that shipping services in the U.S. cost 22
percent more than equivalent services abroad.63 In applying the
words of Ferguson, the Jones Act’s imposition of high capital costs
on domestic shipping has reduced the variety of shipping
companies available and in turn has raised costs for consumers.64
B. Inefficiency by Reducing the Extent of Competition
1.

Shipping Companies

Despite the Jones Act, there has been a gradual but steady
decline in the number of coastwise shipping companies since the
1930s—an era which marked the rise of the railroad industry.65
58. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, PUB NO. 3201, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS I (1999), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3201.pdf
[hereinafter
1999
ECONOMIC EFFECTS].
59. Id.
60. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, PUB NO. 3519, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS XVIII (2002), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3519.pdf.
61. 1999 ECONOMIC EFFECTS, supra note 58, at 98.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See Ferguson, supra note 40.
65. DE LA PEDRAJA, supra note 10, at 53.
OF
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While one of the purported intentions of the Jones Act was to
foster the continued existence of the U.S. merchant marine, in
reality this law has created significant barriers to entry for the
domestic shipping industry and has stymied competition in the
marketplace. 66 As federal judge Gustavo A. Gelpi has explained,
“[b]ecause of U.S. law governing cabotage, which imposes
extensive requirements for vessels engaged in maritime shipping
between U.S. ports, it is difficult for new firms to enter the
market.” 67 These barriers to entry are born out of the Jones Act
either explicitly or consequentially.
Since the Jones Act prohibits non-U.S.-built, owned, and
operated vessels from engaging in coastwise trade, foreign
shipping companies are explicitly barred from entering the U.S.
market. 68 As a consequence of the Jones Act, a prospective
company seeking to enter the U.S. coastwise shipping market
must make a sizable capital investment to order the construction
of a Jones Act-eligible vessel from a U.S. shipping yard.69 Such an
investment would be two to four times larger than the investment
necessary to purchase an equivalent vessel from a foreign
shipping yard.70
In addition, this hypothetical prospective
shipping company would need to wait approximately three
unfeasible years for the U.S. shipbuilder to design and construct
the vessel before it could begin its operations. 71 Thus, existing
U.S. coastwise shipping companies, while not directly subsidized
by the government, are akin to Amtrak in terms of receiving
government-created protection from competition. 72
An apt illustration of this lack of competition exists in Hawaii,
where cargo owners must choose between just two main shipping
companies Horizon Lines and Matson Navigation. Recently, a
66. See Jackson Thies, The Long Case for Horizon Lines, SEEKING ALPHA
(last visited Sept. 13, 2012), http://seekingalpha.com/article/136845-the-longcase-for-horizon-lines.
67. Rivera-Muñiz v. Horizon Lines Inc., 737 F.Supp.2d 57, 60 (D.P.R.
2010).
68. 46 U.S.C. § 55102 (2006).
69. Thies, supra note 66.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Tad DeHaven, Privatizing Amtrak, THE CATO INSTITUTE, (June
2010),
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/amtrak/
subsidies.pdf.
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group of Hawaiian business owners, who either directly or
indirectly utilize the shipping services of these two companies,
brought an action against the United States alleging that the
cabotage provisions of the Jones Act created a frivolous
obstruction to interstate commerce in Hawaii in violation of the
Commerce Clause. 73 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to suspend
the Jones Act in Hawaii, arguing it caused citizens of Hawaii
“irreparable harm as a result of artificial high prices and
restrictions on Hawaiian commerce.” 74 One of the plaintiffs, a
former bakery owner whose business went bankrupt, argued that
the high shipping costs between Hawaii and the U.S. mainland
was a significant factor in the demise of his business. 75 He noted
that the fees charged by Matson Navigation Co. and other U.S.
carriers exceeded the fees charged by foreign shippers in
similarly-distanced world ports by forty percent. 76
In an
unpublished opinion, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’
claims, holding they could not satisfy any of the three standing
requirements—injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 77
Similarly, disgruntled consumers in Puerto Rico, where 80%
of all consumer goods are shipped from the U.S. mainland by sea
and air, filed a class action in 2009 against the three main
coastwise shipping companies, alleging anti-competitive conduct
including price-fixing which elevated the prices of goods shipped
to Puerto Rico. 78 The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant
shipping companies, Horizon Lines, Sea Star Lines and Crowley
Liner Services, which combined to control 87% of Puerto Rican
cabotage, uniformly increased their shipping rates since 2003.79
73. Kauai Kunana Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS
114123 at *3, *9 (D. Haw. Dec 8, 2009).
74. Id. at *3, *4.
75. Id. at *10.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *10-15. Specifically, the court found first that the plaintiffs
failed to assert specific imminent harm to themselves sufficient to show
injury in fact. Id. at *10-14. Next, the court found that at best the plaintiffs
demonstrated a correlation between the Jones Act and their companies’
demise, but the speculative affidavits used for this showing fell short of
establishing causation. Id. at *14-15. The court concluded that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrated that their purported injury would be addressed by a
favorable decision. Id. at *14-15.
78. Rivera-Muñiz, 737 F.Supp.2d at 59-60, 62.
79. Id. at 60. Horizon provides approximately 35% of Puerto Rican
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Unlike the plaintiffs in Kauai Lunana Dairy, the plaintiffs here
did not question the validity or constitutionality of the Jones Act;
despite this, the court noted sua sponte, that U.S. cabotage laws
obstruct new companies from entering the market. 80 Therefore, a
reasonable inference can be made that the Jones Act promotes or
at least enables anti-competitive practices among shipping
companies, which negatively impact consumers. 81
2.

Ship Builders

During World War II, the United States embarked on a
prolific shipbuilding campaign which, by the end of the war,
enabled the nation to proclaim itself the proud possessor of the
world’s largest merchant fleet—an ostensibly enviable
distinction. 82 In reality, the superfluous U.S. merchant fleet of
five thousand vessels destroying demand in the market, combined
with the innovative Japanese rebuilding their shipyards from
scratch with cheap labor, created a crisis for U.S. shipbuilders
from which it has never recovered. 83 After World War II, the
Japanese shipbuilders eventually captured market share from
foreign nations by implementing greater efficiencies and
reinvesting profits into new technologies. 84 In contrast, it is not
unfair to characterize American shipbuilding as inferior to foreign

cabotage, Crowley accounts for approximately 31%, and Sea Star accounts for
approximately 21%. Id. The remaining 13% is provided by Trailer Bridge
Inc. who was not a defendant in the lawsuit. Id. The court indicated that
Trailer’s small market share was not sufficient to moderate shipping rates.
Id. at 62.
80. Id. at 60.
81. See id. In Rivera-Muñiz, the plaintiffs prevailed past the pleading
stage as the court dismissed the defendants’ motion to dismiss with regards
to the price fixing claim. Id. at 62. Ultimately, the parties settled out of
court for multi million dollars. Horizon Lines Reaches Puerto Rico Class
Action Settlement Agreement, THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE, (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/horizon-lines-reaches-puerto-ricoclass-action-settlement-agreement; http://southflorida.citybizlist.com/6/2011
/4/11/Sea-Star-Line-Crowley-Liner-to-Pay-1.7M-Each-to-Settle-Class-Actionover-Price-Gouging--cbl.aspx.
82. DE LA PEDRAJA, supra note 10, at 136-47.
83. Id. at 147; Bruce Nolan, Avondale Closing News is No Surprise to
Maritime Experts, NOLA (Jul. 18, 2010, 1:00PM), http://www.nola
.com/business/index.ssf/2010/07/avondale_closing_news_is_no_su.html.
84. Nolan, supra note 83.
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shipbuilding in terms of both quality and cost. 85 The Jones Act’s
U.S.-build requirement is essentially a government-created
monopoly that disincentivizes (or at least removes any incentives
for) U.S. shipbuilders from pursuing innovation; as a result,
American shipbuilding quality has lagged its counterparts in
Europe and Asia. 86 MIT Professor Ernst Frankel once explained,
“It is a basic finding of economics that government subsidies, aids,
protection, and regulation of an industry will cause its
productivity to decline.” 87
Ironically, as the demand for U.S.-built ships has waned over
the decades, most U.S. shipyards have been acquired by Northrop
Grumman or General Dynamics, both of which are large, defense
contractors.88 These companies are widely known for their
military contracts, not commercial ship production. 89 Since these
two primary U.S. shipbuilders exist in large part because of their
contracts with the military, it seems that the Jones Act’s original
concern—to ensure the adequacy of domestic shipyard facilities in
times of emergency—will either always be satisfied or has been
completely frustrated depending on how it is considered. While
the two main U.S. shipbuilders are capable and practiced in
constructing naval ships, the current Jones Act fleet in existence
today—182 self-propelled vessels (including just 7 tankers and 23
containerships)—would be of little use to the military in a
hypothetical conflict. 90
III. MODERN DAY CRITICISM

A. The BP Oil Spill
On April 20, 2010, a massive blowout and fire in the well of
85. Gray, supra note 46, at 202, 209.
86. See id. at 203.
87. Id.
88. Joseph Darcy, Short Sea Shipping: Barriers, Incentives, and
Feasibility of Truck Ferry, (June 2009) (unpublished thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology) (on file with Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Library,
Massachusetts
Institute
of
Technology),
available
at
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49879.
89. Id.
90. The Committee on International Trade, The Ramifications of the
Port Security Legislation on Trade and National Security, 63 The Record,
161, 165 (2008). [hereinafter Ramifications].
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the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico caused
the worst oil spill in the nation’s history, left 11 men dead, and
grabbed front-page headlines across the country for months.91
While the primary discussion focused on the precise dollar figure
for which to hold BP accountable, just beneath the radar was a
robust debate about the effects that the Jones Act had on the
disaster. Reports surfaced that foreign nations, such as the
Netherlands and Belgium had offered oil skimmers and other
vessels to aid in the cleanup, but these vessels were prohibited
from participating because of the Jones Act. 92 The Obama
Administration was also criticized for its purported failure to
waive the Jones Act to allow participation from foreign-flagged
vessels.93 Among the critics was Hawaii Representative Charles
Djou, who along with representatives from Florida and Texas,
sent the President a letter in mid-June urging him to waive the
Jones Act and allow assistance from foreign vessels. 94
Others, however, claimed that reports about the President’s
failure to waive the Jones Act were completely false. According to
the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling, while the federal government did reject
certain offers of assistance from foreign nations, the decisions
were based on operational circumstances, not the Jones Act.95 For
example, the Commission noted that it would have taken several
weeks for certain Dutch ships to get outfitted and travel to the
Gulf region. 96 The Commission also indicated that the National
Incident Commander, Admiral Thad Allen, “appear[ed] to have
91. See Ben Casselman, Russel Gold, & Angel Gonzalez, Blast Jolts Oil
World—Gulf Rig Explodes…, WALL ST. J., April 22, 2010, at A1; Jerry
Markon, Criminal Charges Considered in BP Oil Spill, WASH. POST, March
29, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com.
92. Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Gulf Cleanup so Slow?, WALL ST. J. , July
1, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034260045753396
50877298556.html.
93. Id.
94. Djou Calls for Obama to Waive Jones Act to Aid Oil Spill Clean-Up,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
June
16,
2010,
available
at
THE
http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/96443164.html?1d=96443164.
95. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of
Offshore Drilling, (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINA
L.pdf at 142.
96. Id. at 143.
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granted waivers and exemptions when requested,” although it did
not cite any examples.97
Still others claimed the Jones Act waiver issue had absolutely
no effect on the cleanup efforts. For instance, H. Clayton Cook Jr.,
former general counsel of the U.S. Maritime Administration,
pointed out in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that the Jones
Act permits foreign-flagged vessels to operate in U.S. waters to
assist in oil cleanups without a waiver. 98 In fact, as Cook noted,
46 U.S.C.S. § 55113 does permit a foreign-flagged vessel to operate
in U.S. waters to assist in the cleanup of an oil spill as long as
there is not an adequate number of U.S.-flagged vessels available
to clean the oil in a timely manner. 99 The National Commission
also noted that the Jones Act was largely inapplicable because it
does not prevent a vessel from loading up with oil and
transporting it to more than three miles off the coast. 100
Even if the Jones Act defenders were right in their claims
that the Jones Act did not disrupt the oil spill cleanup efforts, it is
evident that a hypothetical America facing a comparable oil spill
without the Jones Act would be less filled with conjecture, finger
pointed, and red tape and better able to concentrate on the relief
efforts.

97. Id.
98. H. Clayton Cook Jr., Don’t Blame Delays on the Jones Act, WALL. ST.
J., July 10, 2010, at A12, available at http://online.wsj.com/article$B1000
1424052748703636404575353423992842474.html.
99. Id.; 46 U.S.C.S. § 55113 (2006). The statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an oil spill response
vessel documented under the laws of a foreign country may operate
in waters of the United States on an emergency and temporary
basis, for the purpose of recovering, transporting, and unloading in a
United States port oil discharged as a result of an oil spill in or near
those waters, if--(1) an adequate number and type of oil spill
response vessels documented under the laws of the United States
cannot be engaged to recover oil from an oil spill in or near those
waters in a timely manner, as determined by the Federal On-Scene
Coordinator for a discharge or threat of a discharge of oil; and (2) the
foreign country has by its laws accorded to vessels of the United
States the same privileges accorded to vessels of the foreign country
under this section.
100. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling, supra note 95, at 143.
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B. Short Sea Shipping
The U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act will potentially
restrict development in one of the few areas where maritime
growth is expected: short-sea shipping. Prior to World War II,
“short-sea shipping,” which encompasses shipping operations
along the coasts and inland waterways, was a robust enterprise in
America. 101 However, following World War II, America enjoyed an
extensive development of its highway system which enabled the
proliferation of trucking as the preferred and most cost-effective
means of transporting goods around the country. 102 Given the
prohibitive costs imposed by the Jones Act, including the
employment of only U.S. crews and use of only American-built
vessels, short-sea shipping struggled to compete with trucking,
especially because trucking was benefited by relatively low fuel
costs and minimal traffic congestion for several decades.103
Recently, because of high fuel costs, paralyzing highway
congestion, a dearth of truck drivers, and an inadequate highway
system, which is no longer expanding, there has been a renewed
interest in the viability of increased short-sea shipping.104
Today, short-sea shipping is a part of an intermodal
transportation network. 105 The first part of the process is referred
to as “drayage,” which is the transportation of goods a short
distance by truck from their origin to a nearby port. 106 Next, a
vessel transports the goods over a medium or long distance to
another port where they are subsequently picked up by another
truck which brings the goods a short distance to their final
destination. 107 This process is streamlined by the use of roll on,
101. See Global Insight, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF
SECRETARY/MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, Four Corridor Case Studies of
Short-Sea Shipping Services, U.S. Dept of Trans. Office of the Secretary /
Maritime Administration, (Aug. 15, 2006), at 1, available at
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/USDOT_-_Four_Corridors_Case_Study
_ (15-Aug-06).pdf [hereafter Four Corridor].
102. Id. at 1-2.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id.
105. Anastassios N. Perakis & Athanasios Denisis, A Survey of Short Sea
Shipping and its Prospects in the USA, 35 MARIT. POL’Y & MGMT. 591, 595
(2008), available at http://intermodalmarine.com/pdfs/Survey%20of%20SSS%
20Prospects%20in%20the%20U.S..pdf.
106. Four Corridor, supra note 101, at 1.
107. Id.

THE
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roll off vessels, called Ro-Ro vessels, which allow trucks or other
cargo to be easily transferred on and off the vessel. 108
In 2007, optimism for increased short-sea shipping grew when
President Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007, which included a Short Sea Transportation Initiative.109
The Act set forth that “The Secretary of Transportation shall
establish a short sea transportation program and designate short
sea transportation projects to be conducted under the program to
mitigate landside congestion.” 110 However, despite its sensible
purpose and strong industry and political support, the initiative
has been slow to create traction for short-sea shipping since it did
not authorize additional funding or account for some prohibitive
obstacles. 111 One necessity is investing in the infrastructure to
support short-sea shipping—this includes alterations to port
facilities so that they can accommodate increased vessel traffic. In
addition, while current sea ports are designed mainly for large,
oceangoing vessels which utilize cranes to transfer cargo, shortsea shipping vessels will require ramps and wide dock space so
trucks can roll on and off the vessels. 112 Not surprisingly, some
stakeholders have blamed the U.S.-build provisions of the Jones
Act for impeding the economic viability of a meaningful
development in short-sea shipping.113 Most of these complaints
focus on the increased start-up costs for short-sea shipping, since
purchasing a vessel from the global market is substantially less
108. Perakis, supra note 105, at 595. Ro-Ro vessels are contrasted with
Lo-Lo vessels (lift on, lift off), which are generally smaller containerships
which require cranes to lift cargo onto and off of the vessel. Id. at 593.
109. David J. Farrell Jr., America’s Marine Highway a/k/a Short-Sea
Shipping: A Win-Win Proposition, 5 BENEDICT’S MAR. BULL., 221, 221 (3rd/4th
Quarter 2007), available at http://www.sealaw.org/documents/ShortSea
Shipping.pdf. Farrell cites truck pollution and traffic as the impetus for the
short-sea shipping initiative, and notes that, “Americans annually lose 3.7
billion hours, wasting 2.3 billion gallons of fuel, at a cost of $200 billion just
sitting in traffic.” Id. at 222.
110. Short Sea Transportation, 46 U.S.C. § 55601(a) (2007 & Supp. 2012).
111. Bryant E. Gardner, Short Sea Shipping Steams Ahead, 7 BENEDICT’S
MAR. BULL., 112, 113 (2nd /3rd Quarter 2009), available at
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/Gardner_2.pdf.
112. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Freight Transportation: Short Sea
Shipping Option Shows Importance of Systematic Approach to Investment
Decisions, at 13-14 (July 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d05768.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2005 Report].
113. Garnder, supra note 111, at 115.
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expensive than purchasing the equivalent vessel from a U.S.
shipyard.114
IV. PROPOSALS

Reform of the Jones Act is required if America is serious
about pursuing certain maritime-related goals, reducing highway
congestion and pollution, promoting a swift response to coastal
disasters, and benefiting its economy as a whole. The first step is
repealing the U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act. 115 For
shipping companies, replacement of their aging Jones Act fleets
will be a critical issue in the coming years, and obtaining
financing for new vessel construction in our current stagnant
economy could prove an insurmountable challenge. 116 Given that
foreign-made vessels, equivalent if not superior in quality, could
be purchased at a fraction of the cost, it seems contrary to
America’s general economic principles to prohibit such
purchasing. Not only will repealing the U.S.-build requirement of
the Jones Act benefit existing shipping companies, it may foster
an era of new shipping companies which can provide the industry
with much-needed competition. Furthermore, it may serve as the
catalyst that America’s complacent shipbuilding companies need
to innovate and streamline their operations.
Secondly, the United States should liberalize its cabotage
laws with the goal of achieving a middle ground on the global
spectrum of cabotage regimes. Despite purportedly embracing
liberal economic policies, the United States’ approach to cabotage
laws is much more closely aligned with the Chinese’s ultrarestrictive cabotage regime than it is with the moderate approach
implemented by the European Union or the liberal policies
employed in Australia and New Zealand. 117 Similar to America,
China prohibits international shipping companies from
transporting goods between Chinese ports; although, the Chinese
government takes things a step further by also setting shipping

114. GAO 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 13.
115. 46 U.S.C. § 55102 (2006).
116. See Hansen, Dilemma, supra note 48, at 4.
117. Mary R. Brooks, Liberalization in Maritime Transport, Int’l Transp.
Forum (2009), available at http://www.Internationaltransportforum.org/Pup
/pdf/09FP02.pdf.
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prices—a socialist practice repugnant to America. 118
Other
nations with restrictive cabotage laws include Japan, which
restricts its coastwise shipping, including among its many islands,
to just Japanese shipping companies. 119 Interestingly, because of
its high labor rates, Japanese cargo companies will send large
quantities of its international cargo to nearby Korea for
transshipment to the United States and Europe to take advantage
of the lower rates offered by international Korean shipping
companies. 120
At the opposite end of the spectrum are countries like
Australia and New Zealand, which have very liberal cabotage
regimes. 121 In Australia, coastwise trade, referred to locally as
“coasting” trade, is open to foreign ship operators and regulated by
a permit and licensing system. 122 Coasting trade, governed by the
Navigation Act of 1912, 123 was liberalized in 1998, partly because
the nation was forced to turn to international freight service since
it was not equipped to meet demand. 124 Australia’s clever
licensing system includes requirements designed to prevent
foreign-labor abuses and advantages—an aspect of certain concern
in the United States. To be issued a permit, a foreign shipping
company is mandated to pay its crew Australian wages and
cannot be subsidized by its government while it operates on the
Australian coast. 125
In addition, security is addressed by
mandating that foreign shipping companies and their vessels
must satisfy the requirements of the International Maritime
Organization 126 and the International Labor Organization.127
In the middle of the spectrum is the European Union, which
liberalized its coastwise trade laws in 1992 to permit any EU118. Id. at 15.
119. Id. at 14.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 6-8.
122. Id. at 6-7.
123. Navigation Act of 1912, Part VI – THE COASTING TRADE,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/na1912123/.
124. Brooks, supra note 117, at 6.
125. Id. at 7.
126. Navigation Act of 1912, Part VB – OFF-SHORE INDUSTRY
VESSELS AND OFF-SHORE INDUSTRY MOBILE UNITS, Division 283J.,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/na1912123/.
LABOUR
ORG.
(2006),
127. See
Labour
Standards,
INT’L
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/lang--en/index.htm.
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flagged vessel to transport goods to any port in the European
Union. 128 Prior to 1992, several northern European nations129
already had open, liberal cabotage laws, while southern European
had closed, restrictive laws. 131
Despite its
nations 130
liberalization, the European Union’s approach to cabotage is still
considered a middle ground between Australia and the United
States/China as it allows member nations to impose crew
nationality requirements, vessel ownership restrictions, and other
fiscal requirements. 132 The European Union, in an effort to
improve efficiency of road freight, also has liberalized its road
cabotage laws to allow a hauler to conduct three cabotage
operations within a seven day period after unloading international
cargo. 133 This provision seeks to prevent trucks from being driven
long distances without carrying any freight, which wastes fuel and
contributes to traffic congestion. 134
America’s new regime should be a combination of Australia’s
licensing program and the European Union’s road cabotage
policies. Using this system as a model, the United States should
sell licenses to foreign shipping companies that would permit
them to deliver goods to the United States and then complete up
to three cabotage operations before departing for an international
port. This regime would provide the U.S. government with some
revenue in the form of licensing fees and would promote coastwise
shipping competition between American and foreign nations likely
without destroying the U.S. merchant marine entirely. While
maritime jobs may be lost initially, existing American shipping
companies, which already service the domestic shipping market,
will have a natural competitive advantage—a tremendous head
start—over new, foreign competitors. This valuable advantage
128. Brooks, supra note 117, at 10.
129. These countries included the United Kingdom, Denmark and
Germany. Id.
130. These countries included Greece, Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal.
Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 10.
133. European Comm’n Regulation No. 1072/2009, Article 8, available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R1072:
EN:HTML:NOT.
134. European Comm’n Transport: Cabotage, (last visited Sept. 24, 2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/haulage/cabotage_en.htm.
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combined with a repeal of the U.S.-build requirement of the Jones
Act should give domestic shipping companies the tools it needs to
implement efficiencies, innovate, and compete. Competition and
innovation are inherently American principles, and it is time to
funnel these principles into the maritime industry by reforming
the Jones Act.
V. CONCLUSION

The American ideal is a nation of progressive ideas and
innovation. Since this country was founded, Americans have been
able to invent, improve, perfect, and prosper in large part because
the nation’s laws did not stand in their way. However, no
legislature is perfect, and at times certain laws have had
unintended negative consequences. Certainly, the intention of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was not to inflate the prices of
consumer goods, or to create insurmountable barriers of entry for
domestic shipping companies, or to foster the decline of the quality
and quantity of American shipbuilding. A vibrant, robust U.S.
merchant marine does not need to be relegated to the confines of a
footnote in a history book, but that is where it is headed. The
domestic shipping industry has become increasingly complacent in
its diminishing role, and Jones Act reform will provide the spark
needed to reverse this course.

